Jimmy Carter, the Unlikely Champion of China’s Village Elections — with Liu Yawei
The Carter Center’s Senior China Advisor talks about the late U.S. President’s relationship with Deng Xiaoping, how China invited him to observe elections, and how the country ultimately shut him out.
The phrase “Chinese village elections” sounds like an oxymoron. As the political heartland of the Chinese Communist Party, the countryside is supposed to be the saintly land of revolution that had rooted out all capitalist elements. Yet, in the post-Cultural Revolution and post-Tiananmen reform period, such “bourgeois” political instruments as popular elections gradually made their way into Chinese villages. Even more unlikely, the party had, to support these elections, invited a “foreign force” as symbolic as the former head of the free world, U.S. President Jimmy Carter.
Current politics make every element of this story almost unthinkable today. Yet, for more than a decade, the Chinese Communist Party did welcome an American president to help China build its grassroots elections, and appeared interested in fostering political change from the bottom up. Carter, who passed away on Dec. 29, was an enthusiastic advocate.
When I learned of the story, I knew I had to dig into it. Few are better suited to tell it than Dr. Liu Yawei, the Senior Advisor on China at the Carter Center and an adjunct professor of political science at Emory University. He was involved in the Carter Center’s China Program from 1997, directed it since 2005, and spearheaded its projects on rural democracy in China. Dr. Liu has written extensively on China’s political developments and grassroots democracy, including three edited book series: Rural Election and Governance in Contemporary China (Northwestern University Press, Xi’an, 2002 and 2004), The Political Readers (China Central Translation Bureau Press, Beijing, 2006), and Elections & Governance (Northwestern University Press, Xi’an, 2009).
In this interview excerpt, which has been edited for brevity and clarity, Dr. Liu Yawei shares his experience working at the Carter Center on rural democracy in China, and offers observations from his unique vantage point about the evolution of U.S.-China relations. And as we remember the legacy of President Carter, besides his efforts to bring the U.S. and China closer, it is worth remembering his deep commitment to democracy around the world.
Enjoy!
Leo
(This interview has been edited for brevity and clarity.)
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‘How could a rising, hopeful China ever establish relations with the imperialistic, capitalistic, filthy US?’
Where were you when China and the United States first established diplomatic relations?
I was a university freshman, and I remember clearly that on December 16, 1978, as we got up for morning exercises, we heard from the loudspeakers on campus about the establishment of diplomatic relations between China and the United States. For our generation, it was a bolt from the blue. How could the U.S., which was deteriorating, filthy, imperialistic, and controlled by Wall Street billionaires, establish diplomatic relations with a China that was rising and full of vitality? It was unbelievable.
In 1979, during Chinese New Year, Deng Xiaoping visited the United States. His visit allowed us to see America for the first time on our 9-inch black-and-white televisions: towering skyscrapers, smiling people, and streets full of cars. It made us realise our ignorance. Our media had completely distorted our understanding of the United States.
Carter would always say, “Nixon was the first American president to recognise ‘One China,’ but I was the first president to say that ‘One China’ means the People’s Republic of China.”
Deng visited the Kennedy Center for the Performing Arts, the Johnson Space Center, the Boeing aircraft manufacturing plant in Seattle, and a Ford car assembly line in Atlanta. All of these made Chinese people realise that the United States had long achieved the “Four Modernisations” that China had just begun discussing. After Deng’s visit to the United States, the need for reform and opening became a consensus that no political force could reverse.
How did you join the Carter Center?
The first time I met President Carter was when I was studying at Emory University, where he taught after leaving the White House. He would meet with international students every fall semester. I asked him a question about Taiwan. When addressing the Taiwan issue, Carter would always say, “Nixon was the first American president to recognise ‘One China,’ but I was the first president to say that ‘One China’ means the People’s Republic of China.”
During my PhD, I took a course on U.S. foreign policy decision making, taught by Robert Pastor. He had worked in Carter’s National Security Council on Latin American issues. After Carter lost the 1980 election, Pastor became a professor at Emory University, and later joined the Carter Center to lead its Latin American projects.
Teaching in academia was to make a living, but participating in changing the country where I was born and raised is my lifelong dream.
After finishing my PhD, I taught U.S. history at a local university. One day in 1996, I received an email from Pastor, saying, “The Carter Center is going to observe elections in China. Since you’re from China, I hope you can help me.” He was an expert on Latin American issues but knew little about Chinese politics, culture, and history. I replied, “But China doesn’t have elections, at least none that I know of.” He told me, “There are elections in China now. Go look it up.” That’s when I learned that China had been conducting village elections for some time. I told Pastor that I could help but had no expertise in elections. He replied, “I can make you an elections expert.”
From 1996 to 1998, I volunteered at the Carter Center. In October 1996, I joined the Carter Center’s election monitoring trip to Nicaragua, which was my first face-to-face opportunity with President Carter.
In the fall of 1998, Pastor became the Vice President of American University and moved to Washington D.C. He asked me to take over the China Village Elections Project at the Carter Center. It’s been 26 years now. In 2008, when the Carter Center turned its China Village Elections Project into the China Program, I resigned from my university job and joined the Carter Center full-time. Teaching in academia was to make a living, but participating in changing the country where I was born and raised is my lifelong dream.
When Carter calls, Deng picks up the phone
Before joining the Carter Center, you volunteered for the Carter Center’s disability program, which partnered with the China Disability Foundation headed by Deng Pufang, Deng Xiaoping’s son. Could you tell us about the Carter Center’s early connections with China?
After Carter left the White House, Deng Xiaoping let it be known to him, through the embassy and other channels, that the Chinese government would welcome him to China at any time.
… a Chinese government department asked if the Carter Center could partner with the China Disabled Persons’ Federation, of which Deng Xiaoping’s son, Deng Pufang, was the chairman.
During a 1987 visit to China, Carter was eager to visit Tibet. But the medical check-up in Chengdu found that Carter had high blood pressure and a fast heart rate. Worried about political repercussions if something were to happen [due to Tibet’s high altitude] to such an important foreign figure, the Sichuan Foreign Affairs Office stopped him from going.
Carter said, “Let me call Deng Xiaoping.” Deng asked him, “Do you think your health is okay?” Carter said, “I’m totally fine.” Deng replied, “If something happens, you are responsible for it.” Carter assured him, “Of course, I’m responsible.” Deng said, “Then we will make an exception,” and Carter went. That’s what the relationship between him and Deng Xiaoping was like.
In the late 1980s or early 1990s, during a visit, Carter told Deng that the Carter Center had projects around the world, and that he was interested in working in China. Shortly after, a Chinese government department asked if the Carter Center could partner with the China Disabled Persons’ Federation, of which Deng Xiaoping’s son, Deng Pufang, was the chairman.
Back then, there were inconsistencies in sign languages across China, while American sign language had been standardised. The Carter Center invited teachers from Chinese deaf schools to the United States for training. I did the simultaneous translation, my first time volunteering for the Carter Center. The Carter Center also helped the Beijing Disabled Persons’ Federation set up a German prosthetics production line. Before the 30th anniversary of diplomatic relations, the Chinese government wrote to Carter, telling him that it was still producing prosthetics. This was the Carter Center’s earliest project in China.
Wang Zhenyao, Zeng Jianhui, and the same-bed-different-dreams of rural electoral reforms
In the mid-1990s, China’s Ministry of Civil Affairs worked to promote popular elections in rural areas. Wang Zhenyao, the senior official responsible for this task, met with Anne Thurston, an American China expert, and asked if there were any U.S.-based non-governmental organisations willing to get involved. Through Thurston, the Carter Center established contact with the ministry, which in 1996 formally invited it to send a delegation to monitor rural elections in China. At the time, the Carter Center was a globally recognised election monitoring body, regularly monitoring presidential or parliamentary elections in transitioning democracies. Although it was a lower-level election in China, President Carter and senior Carter Center leaders thought the project had immense potential, and quickly approved it.
Scholars and ministry officials were convinced that this was the “third rural revolution” — the first being land collectivisation when the Communist Party seized power, and the second being economic liberalisation in rural China in the 1980s.
The collaboration was definitely not Wang Zhenyao’s personal decision; it had to be reviewed by the foreign affairs and public security ministries, and approved by the top leadership. The formal cooperation between the Carter Center and the Ministry of Civil Affairs began in 1998 with a three-year agreement.
What prompted the Ministry of Civil Affairs to promote rural elections in China? Was it a PR stunt to smoothen China’s entry into the WTO, or a sincere preparation for gradual democratic reforms?
We should not doubt the motivations of the Ministry of Civil Affairs officials. In the civil affairs system, the grassroots governance section has little money and had to ask lower levels to conduct elections without resources. So the solution is to seek foreign support. Website and IT system development required funding, so if the Ford Foundation or the Carter Center were willing to participate, why not take advantage of that?
Without Chinese village committee elections, there would not have been a resurgence of Chinese political science after the Cultural Revolution. They finally provided a research subject, and universities’ political science departments flourished. Scholars and ministry officials were convinced that this was the “third rural revolution” — the first being land collectivisation when the Communist Party seized power, and the second being economic liberalisation in rural China in the 1980s.
… “If a candidate wants to win through vote-buying, they have to bribe 2,000 voters. But without elections, they would only need to bribe a township head or a party secretary, just one or two people. Even from the negative perspective, vote-buying still marked progress.”
A ministry official told me, “Elections are a process, a culture. With village committee elections, the vast majority of Chinese citizens can participate in elections.” The first step was to get the Chinese people to break free from thousands of years of feudal culture and institutional limitations, to no longer feel they had no right to participate in democratic elections, and to learn to make independent judgments and choices.
Later, vote-buying emerged in rural areas, and those opposed to village elections said, “Look at rural elections, there’s vote-buying, and it’s controlled by family clans and organized crime.” A ministry official told me, “If a candidate wants to win through vote buying, they have to bribe 2,000 voters. But without elections, they would only need to bribe a township head or a party secretary, just one or two people. Even from the negative perspective, vote-buying still marked progress.”
Around 2008, at a National People’s Congress press conference, Premier Wen Jiabao stated that China would embrace “democratisation with Chinese characteristics,” with rule of law, looser media supervision, and grassroots elections that would gradually move toward direct elections of township and county leaders.
When direct elections began in Buyun Township in 1998, it stirred the world. Unfortunately, the election was later deemed “unconstitutional” because, according to regulations, township heads must be elected by the township people’s congress representatives, not by direct vote. But at that time, direct elections of township heads were tolerable because China wanted to experiment. So, it’s incorrect to say the Ministry of Civil Affairs was just putting on a show.
However, some argued that it’s more credible for outsiders to tell China’s story. The director of the National People’s Congress Foreign Affairs Committee at that time was Zeng Jianhui, who had been the deputy director of Xinhua News Agency. In one of our meetings, he said, “We know that when we say we have democracy, no one believes us. But when the Carter Center says China has democracy, people believe them.”
I would like to specifically mention two officials: Zeng Jianhui, whom you just mentioned and was the head of the National People’s Congress Foreign Affairs Committee, and Doje Cering, Minister of Civil Affairs and former chairman of the Tibet Autonomous Region. These two were the main contacts for the Carter Center’s rural election work in China.
Zeng Jianhui was the author of the “April 26” Editorial during the Tiananmen protests, which defined student demonstrations as a “riot.” Doje Cering, a Tibetan, served as the chairman of Tibet — under then-local party secretary Hu Jintao — and suppressed the March 1989 demonstrations in Tibet.
How should we view Chinese Communist officials, who experienced the 1980s, Tiananmen, and the end of political reform, and later took responsibility for promoting grassroots elections?
Zeng Jianhui had worked for Xinhua for many years and served as the director of the State Council Information Office, so he understood the power of the media and was aware that Chinese media had little credibility overseas. He believed that presenting China’s story through overseas channels would better shape China’s image. The National People’s Congress invited the Carter Center to observe elections for grassroots representatives and participate in training programs for these representatives and sent foreign committee officials to the Carter Center as visiting scholars. Without his push, this would not have been possible. He was effective in advancing China’s integration with the international community beyond the economic and trade sectors.
When one of the candidates mentioned in his campaign speech that, if elected, he would bring fibre optic cable to the village, Friedman said, “That’s it, fibre optics. Globalisation has penetrated Chinese villages.”
The Ministry of Civil Affairs is another story. Although Doje Cering was the minister, it was middle-ranking officials in the grassroots governance section like Wang Zhenyao who primarily pushed for democratic elections. Wang later left for Beijing Normal University, where he founded the China Philanthropy Research Institute with support from the Rockefeller Brothers Fund, the Ford Foundation, and the Gates Foundation.
In China, any reform requires a breakthrough point. I suspect that reform-minded officials like Wang Zhenyao, who “touched the stones to cross the river,” would go wherever they saw possibility and change course when things didn’t work out. When the election route did not work, he turned to nurturing China’s philanthropy sector. With China’s economic development and the rise of the middle class, there were many wealthy people. If the culture of the wealthy class could be changed to foster a sense of public welfare, it could also help promote progress in China’s political culture. These officials have their ideals and courage but are also aware of the risks in China’s political environment, so they proceeded cautiously.
In the 1990s and early 2000s, the Carter Center invited foreign observers to Chinese rural elections, including The New York Times’ Thomas Friedman and political scientists like Stanford’s Larry Diamond and Jean Oi. What role did these foreign experts play, and what were the criteria for invitations?
Initially, my professor Robert Pastor decided which scholars or media representatives would participate. After I took over, we mainly invited well-known China scholars, especially those who worked on village elections. We also invited representatives from American media and staff from the U.S. State Department, the American embassy, and the National Endowment for Democracy.
Did they play the role of monitoring and evaluating the elections?
Not really, they just observed. Friedman is a famous columnist for The New York Times. After participating in our observation, he wrote three opinion pieces, one of which was titled “Here Comes the Sun.” In his bestselling book The Lexus and the Olive Tree, he describes observing the election in a village outside Dalian. I was his translator. When one of the candidates mentioned in his campaign speech that, if elected, he would bring fibre optic cable to the village, Friedman said, “That’s it, fibre optics. Globalisation has penetrated Chinese villages.” Then he left to play tennis. His opinion pieces were impactful. They changed the perception of China in American political and academic circles.
Later, Chinese authorities began to view the Carter Center as a threatening beast, which I felt was exaggeration and flattery. They made us look much bigger than we were.
The invited scholars had all done deep research into Chinese politics. For example, Ohio State University’s Kevin O’Brien and his former student professor Li Lianjiang co-wrote articles mainly focusing on grassroots governance and the People’s Congress system.
The Ministry of Civil Affairs later cooperated with the European Union, which invested a lot of resources and established the China-EU Training Programme on Village Governance at the Civil Affairs College in Hebei’s Yanjiao. Their budget was around 9 million euros. We were pretty envious. The Carter Center’s “China Village Committee Elections Project” had been my sole responsibility for a long time, and at most there were only three people working on it. Later, Chinese authorities began to view the Carter Center as a threatening beast, which I felt was exaggeration and flattery. They made us look much bigger than we were.
In their view, Chinese people never have any agency; whenever they try to achieve their demands, they are accused of collaborating with foreign forces. Local governments always blame foreigners to shirk responsibility.
Then the Taishi Village incident happened. The villagers in Taishi wanted to remove their village committee head, but the local civil affairs department disagreed, so the villagers went on a hunger strike. At that time, I was leading a study group of Duke University students in China. Someone from the Ministry of Civil Affairs called me, saying they heard the Carter Center was paying villagers in Taishi to go on a hunger strike. I told them I had no idea where Taishi Village even was. They asked, “Are you sure?” I said, “It’s impossible, I am in Beijing with students, and I just read about it in the newspaper.”
After that came the Wukan protests in Guangdong province. This incident was even bigger. Professor Ai Xiaoming from Sun Yat-sen University received funding from the Ford Foundation and was accused of being an external hostile force intervening in China’s internal affairs. People claimed that foreign forces had incited the Wukan villagers, similar to the Chinese narrative about Hong Kong protesters being funded and controlled by the CIA. In their view, Chinese people never have any agency; whenever they try to achieve their demands, they are accused of collaborating with foreign forces. Local governments always blame foreigners to shirk responsibility.
I would never have thought that such grassroots democratic social events ended up being linked to the Carter Center. Besides inviting American experts to observe elections in China, you also organised trips for Chinese officials and scholars to observe elections in the U.S. How did this start?
Before 2020, the Carter Center never observed U.S. elections. Now that America’s own democracy is facing issues, observing and participating in U.S. elections has become a major task for the Carter Center. In 2024, the Carter Center had projects in all the battleground states.
To reciprocate the Carter Center being invited to observe Chinese elections, we invited Chinese officials to observe elections abroad. We hoped they would visit elections in developing countries where the Carter Center had projects. However, for various reasons, we were never able to.
For example, I once tried to get them to join the Carter Center’s election observations in Nepal, but India did not want Chinese officials there, fearing infiltration. We invited the ministry to Jamaica, but the ministry didn’t send anyone; only a few Chinese scholars participated. We also tried to organise a visit for ministry officials to study Taiwan’s grassroots governance. Some Taiwanese universities were eager to host, but it was harder for Chinese officials to visit Taiwan than the U.S.
In the end, all their trips were in the U.S. From 1998 to 2012, we arranged for them to observe every midterm and presidential elections. They invited officials and scholars, and we invited scholars too.
When China shut out Carter
The Carter Center created three websites, including the China Elections and Governance website (选举与治理网), which was influential among a generation of Chinese liberal intellectuals. Could you talk about its history?
The first project was actually building the Chinese Grassroots Democracy website for the Ministry of Civil Affairs, which it used to publish information. It was managed by them; we had no editorial control.
By the end of 2012, the Chinese government clearly stated that the Carter Center could only work on U.S.-China relations and no longer on political reform. The Center had to pivot.
Because reports on elections drew a lot of attention, especially after the Buyun Township case, the need for an online hub of information became apparent. At the time, search engines were not very powerful, so I decided to create a website specifically to aggregate information on grassroots elections and governance for the use of officials, scholars, and ordinary citizens.
On July 1, 2002, the China Elections and Governance website went online. In 2012, the Beijing Internet Information Office blocked it. We then kept changing the domain name and publishing articles until March 2023. The website remained accessible until 2024. After [the Carter Center’s] U.S.-China Perception Monitor published an article by [political scientist] Hu Wei, which provoked controversy, the Carter Center realised that our websites had been designed by Chinese companies with backdoor access to readers’ IP addresses. To protect their privacy and security, we took the website offline.
I had maintained the website almost daily. It had nearly 300,000 articles, 90% of which were reposted from elsewhere. 2008 to 2012 were the website’s best years. It had many contributors, Chinese partners, and nearly ten editors. We are looking for an institution interested in bringing it back online, at least as a database for scholars. I firmly believe that political reform will return to China one day, and when that happens, the website will still have a role to play.
By the end of 2012, the Chinese government clearly stated that the Carter Center could only work on U.S.-China relations and no longer on political reform. The Center had to pivot. In 2014, we launched the U.S.-China Perception Monitor, which is still online, though constantly blocked in China. Each time it is blocked, we change the domain name and lose many readers. Recently, we changed the domain name again, and while the Internet Information Office hasn’t blocked it, WeChat has.
The Carter Center collaborated with the Institute of International Political Economy at Renmin University to build the website. Can you talk about how the collaboration with Chinese partners worked at the time?
… we were told the website was illegal; to operate in China, we would have to clean the database and remove any articles criticising the Chinese government.
Our cooperation with the International Relations College at Renmin University was with Professor Zhang Xiaojin. For a website in China, we needed a domestic partner. We got in touch with Zhang and he agreed right away. Later, he moved to a new position at Tsinghua, but Renmin University wouldn’t let him. There was an internal report about the Carter Center and the China Elections and Governance website. Renmin told Zhang he had to sever Renmin University’s connection with the China Elections and Governance website before he was permitted to leave. At that point, Tsinghua University’s Department of Political Science became our partner, and the issue was resolved.
In April, 2012, the China Elections and Governance website was blocked in April that year. During President Carter’s 2012 visit to China, we didn’t ask President Carter to bring it up but he told Premier Li, “I hope you can help me with something.” Li Keqiang replied, “Anything.” He said, “We have a Chinese website that has been blocked. Could you look into it?” Li Keqiang inquired, and then our center’s president and I were summoned to the Cyberspace Administration Office, where we were told the website was illegal; to operate in China, we would have to clean the database and remove any articles criticising the Chinese government.
Overall, the China Elections and Governance website was the Carter Center’s most influential project in China. It survived for more than 20 years and was widely known in China and abroad. I keep telling people at the Carter Center that we should retain its database and relaunch it when the time is right. No matter how unlikely, political reform remains an eternal topic for China that is closely related to the country’s future and its ability to achieve modernisation.
I’m unsure why the Ministry of Civil Affairs decided to sever ties with us. At the time, I contacted the official in charge of the cooperation. He said, “This wasn’t our decision, and there’s nothing you can do.” Our cooperation with the ministry fizzled out without any formal ceremony or communication.
Later, a friend at the ministry told me, “We’re involved in something I can’t tell you about right now, but after it’s over, it will have a significant impact on your projects in China.” I eventually learned that this was the drafting and passage of the Foreign NGO Law.
Looking at it now, it’s astonishing to imagine a former U.S. president touring China’s rural areas, chatting with scholars, officials, and village leaders about democracy, even holding essay contests and awarding prizes for rural democratic ideas. Did President Carter have any expectations for rural elections in China?
President Carter had a few firm principles regarding U.S.-China relations. First, he was most concerned about Chinese students coming to the U.S., which he had pushed for early on. Everyone knows the story of the “3 a.m. phone call.”
Second, he believed that establishing diplomatic relations with China was the right decision. After normalisation, East Asia became peaceful and stable, and powered the world economy.
The U.S. today is almost like the McCarthy era. If you’re associated with China, you’re pro-Communist, and pro-Communist means anti-American.
Third, President Carter believed that as the world’s two largest economies, China and the U.S., should coexist peacefully and contribute to global development and peace. He believed China’s reform and opening-up had improved the living conditions and freedoms enjoyed by the Chinese people.
Regarding village committee elections, he said the principles of democracy were the same everywhere: voters should hold politicians accountable. He said, “I saw a villager during an election speech holding a recorder and saying, ‘This is your promise from last year’s campaign. Let’s see which of these promises you’ve fulfilled.’ The procedures and forms of democracy might differ worldwide, but the purpose is the same: a candidate must fulfil their promises, or someone else will take their place.” President Carter said. He had high expectations for democracy, hoping that all countries could allow their citizens the freedom to choose and hold officials accountable according to their own conditions and culture.
How did the election projects raise funds back then?
Fundraising wasn’t easy, because American corporations knew that the Carter Center, as a non-profit, published annual financial statements. If they donated to China-related projects, it could be seen as “interfering in internal affairs.” We went to the AT&T office in Beijing, and the person in charge said he admired what we were doing, but if they donated money, the Chinese government would punish them. For projects related to disabilities or cultural exchange, fundraising was easier.
After [Tunisia’s] Jasmine Revolution, there was growing momentum in China to counter so-called “color revolutions.” The Ministry of Civil Affairs had cut off communication with us, and the signal was clear.
Previously, businesses and charitable organisations worried about the Chinese government. Now, they are more worried about attacks from the U.S. government and conservative groups. You can see from tax forms whether a U.S. organisation spent money in China, and to these people any spending means support for the Chinese Communist Party. The U.S. today is almost like the McCarthy era. If you’re associated with China, you’re pro-Communist, and pro-Communist means anti-American.
The China Elections and Governance website officially went offline and the Carter Center’s projects in China essentially ceased in 2012. President Carter made his last visit to China in 2014. What prompted this major shift in the Carter Center’s work in China? What political changes did this reflect?
When Carter visited China, the Chinese side said, “We hope you no longer engage in domestic Chinese projects. You were the president who established diplomatic relations, and we hope you can spend more time and resources on improving U.S.-China relations, fostering mutual understanding between our peoples and elites.”
Before that, we could already sense difficulties with our projects. After [Tunisia’s] Jasmine Revolution, there was growing momentum in China to counter so-called “color revolutions.” The Ministry of Civil Affairs had cut off communication with us, and the signal was clear. In that context, we had to change. Carter was the president who established diplomatic relations, so we started planning work on U.S.-China relations. Our broad organisational focus has been on Africa. So, starting in 2012, we began looking for opportunities for U.S.-China cooperation in Africa.
The death of village electoral reforms
In 2009, President Carter said that China had credible rural elections. However, some Chinese scholars believe that village autonomy had already ended by 2007. How would you draw the timeline of grassroots elections in China?
Grassroots governance and elections began with the dissolution of the communes. After the communes dissolved, chaos ensued in rural areas. During the tenure of Peng Zhen, the chairman of the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress, the NPC passed the trial version of the Organic Law of Village Committees. This marked the beginning of elections, which were later stipulated to be held every 3 years.
If people participated in the elections of township and county-level governments, they would start holding higher levels of government accountable. This would challenge the power of the state and threaten the party’s total control.
At first, the public didn’t believe in it. Who would believe in elections in China? They must be manipulated. The key to an election is candidate selection. If nominations are controlled, as happens for township- and county-level People’s Congresses, an election is meaningless.
Later, Jilin implemented elections with unrestricted nominations and many other innovations. People thought this was the way China would move toward political reform. But as things evolved, the power of the village committees was curbed. Originally, village committees were responsible for taxation, fees, and family planning, but these duties were gradually removed. Resources were controlled by the county civil affairs and finance departments. If we say that village elections ended in 2007, it would be because village committees lost their power.
Why did the Chinese government’s attitude toward village democratic reform change so drastically?
My guess is that, for the Communist Party, village democracy ultimately pointed to what Premier Wen Jiabao called “local regimes” (基层政权). If people participated in the elections of township and county-level governments, they would start holding higher levels of government accountable. This would challenge the power of the state and threaten the party’s total control.
The party’s assessment of political security also changed. Corruption and migrant workers became bigger issues for the party. And as urbanisation increased, young and capable working-aged people left villages for cities, and some began regarding village committee elections as games for women, children, and the elderly. This made elections increasingly toothless. Besides, it is true that in some places, especially where village-run enterprises exist, vote-buying, gang interference, and family clan-controlled elections became commonplace.
Does China’s experience with rural elections prove that the Chinese people are unfit for democracy, and that democracy is doomed to fail in China?
As a Chinese person, hearing people say that Chinese people have these inherent flaws and therefore can’t have democracy feels like an insult. However, many people in China, especially the middle and upper class people who have benefitted from the reform and opening-up policies, now seem to think that “democracy” causes governance failures. They even feel that democracy poses a threat to them and believe the current system is the best because they can rely on ties with the government to get rich.
I’m optimistic about the capabilities of the Chinese people. As long as the government is willing to seriously consider systemic reform and set up appropriate laws and procedures, chaos can be managed. The problems with gangs and family clans are relatively small in scale. But if there’s no space for experimentation and innovation, and if we keep reinforcing the self-fulfilling prophecy that “Chinese people can’t handle democracy,” then China’s political reform will forever be stagnant.
Recommended readings
Friedman, 1999, The Lexus and the Olive Tree, Farrar, Straus and Giroux
O’Brien & Li, 2006, Rightful Resistance in Rural China, Cambridge University Press
About us
The Peking Hotel podcast and newsletter are digital publications in which Liu He interviews China specialists about their first-hand experiences and observations from decades past. The project grew out of Liu’s research at Hoover Institution collecting oral history of China experts living in the U.S. Their stories are a reminder of what China used to be and what it is capable of becoming.
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